Incentivizing Social Graphs

Abstract

We outline a minimal, platform-agnostic framework for rewarding peer-to-peer attestations via stake-backed contracts. Every interaction generates on-ledger promises and network fees that fund a Bitcoin-pegged UBI pool.

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1. Variables & Constants

• i, j: users
• $C_{ij}$: contract between i→j
• $a_i$: amount pre-loaded by initiator
• $b_j$: amount pre-loaded by responder
• $\phi$: network fee rate (0≤φ<1) (0 possible?)
• $F$: total fees accrued (operations) per epoch
• $U_i$: user i's promised earnings

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2. Data Model

Contracts

• $C_{ij} = \{i, j, a, b, status, t_0, t_1\}$
• $amount = max(a, b)$
• status: pending → signed at $t_1$

Earnings

• On signing: $U_j \;+=\; (1-\phi)\,\max(a,b)$

Fees

• Collected by protocol: $F \;+=\; \phi\,\max(a,b)$

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3. Interaction Flow

1. Initiate: i calls createContract(i,j,a) (default a=0)
2. Propose: j calls propose($C_{ij}$,b) (default b=0)
3. Sign: either calls sign($C_{ij}$) → sets status, timestamp
4. Settle:
   • j's pending earnings $U_j += (1-\phi)·\max(a,b)$
   • protocol pool $F += \phi·\max(a,b)$

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4. Network Value & Distribution

Let N be signed contracts in epoch t: $F^{(t)} = \phi\sum_{k=1}^N \max(a_k,b_k)$

Total promised UBI: $\Omega^{(t)} = (1-\phi)\sum_{k=1}^N \max(a_k,b_k)$

Fees F can underwrite growth (marketing, dispute bounties), while Ω funds user UBI.

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5. Discussion

• Stateless: contracts require no user history.
• Flexible fees: setting φ tunes protocol revenue vs. UBI.
• Extensible: layer in on-chain anchoring or trust-scores later.
• Safety: default zero-stake contracts minimize risk.